If a fetus obtains the right to life the moment it is viable, then as neonatal technology and/or access to it improves, the moment a fetus obtains the right to life moves to an earlier point in gestation.

Definitions

Fetus – The unborn offspring from the end of the 8^th week after conception (when the major structures have formed) until birth. Up until the eighth week, the developing offspring is called an embryo.

Right to Life – The inherit right to live possessed by all human persons.

Viability – The ability to potentially live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.

Neonatal Technology – Technology of, relating to, or affecting the newborn and especially the human infant during the first month after birth.

Gestation – The period of development in the uterus from conception until birth; pregnancy.

*UPDATES ABOVE*

Thesis

If a fetus obtains rights the moment it can survive outside the womb (viability), then as medical technology – or access to it – improves, so do the rights of unborn children.

Implications

1) African Fetus gains rights later in pregnancy than American Fetus.

Say a woman in Lakartinya (a rural village in Kenya) and a woman in Phoenix are both impregnated on Halloween night. Now suppose both pregnancies advanced to 24 weeks. Due to access to medical technology that would sustain the life of Phoenix Fetus, that fetus would become ‘viable’ earlier than Lakartinya Fetus. In other words, Phoenix Fetus would be considered a human person, with all legal rights afforded, before the Lakartinya baby, despite the fact they were both conceived on the same night and at the same point of development.

We can even imagine a scenario where Lakartinya Fetus is conceived earlier than Phoenix Fetus, yet still considered ‘merely’ a fetus – a ‘potential person’ – at a later stage of pregnancy than Phoenix Fetus.

2) 1911 Fetus gained rights later in pregnancy than 2011 Fetus.

I am not an expert on medical technology by any means, but I believe it would be safe to assume it has advanced in a relevant way over the past one-hundred years.

If this is the case, then those that that look to the presence of viability when determining fetal personhood must say that a fetus conceived in 1911 became a person at a later point in development than one conceived in 2011.

This would make the question of whether or not a fetus at a particular point in development is a right-bearing person a sort of ‘sliding scale’ – as the years increase, the number of weeks required for a fetus to be considered a human person decreases.

I see these as just a couple of reasons why viability should not be looked at as the determining factor when assessing the personhood of unborn children.

Part 1 | Humanity & Conception Considered

Response to Part 1

Part 2 | The Argument from Sentience Considered

Response to Part 2

Part 3 | The Argument from Size Considered

Response to Part 3